The Insurgency: A Realistic Strategy

The communist insurgency in the Philippines is one of the longest-running rebellions in the world, and volumes have been written to document it's thirty-five year existence. The rebellion took root in the desperation of an impoverished people, fueled by a government that failed and, more often, abused those people. The dictatorship that was newly emerging when the insurgency began is gone, but the corruption and mistreatment of the people by their own government continues. Make no mistake, government is an active contributor to the conditions that feed this rebellion. People live in poverty in many countries, including the United States, and still don't take up arms against their government. The outstanding difference, and the one that I believe leads to insurrection, is the fact that those other countries have working governments that make an honest effort to respond to the needs of their people, and do not try to take advantage of them at every opportunity.

The Philippine Government itself is not abusive, but more than a few individuals within government misuse their positions at the expense of the people. Government officials, especially in the outlying areas, operate as if they were feudal lords, controlling their lands with the power of life and death, taxes and fees, and unchecked authority. Renewing a license requires bribe money. Getting a permit to start a business or put up a building requires kickbacks to a host of open hands. Lodging a complaint about such things with the local police requires "filing fees" and "consideration" for the investigators. In some cases, the police themselves provide the muscle to back up corrupt officials. How does one survive in an environment like that? Who does one turn to, when the very government which is supposed to protect you is the one squeezing the life out of you? When the mechanisms that are supposed to prevent such abuses are themselves corrupted?

Rightly or wrongly, a segment of the population has chosen to take up arms against its own government in an effort to force change. That segment does not represent the majority, but it does voice the sentiments of a large part of the population. Traditionally, insurgencies arise because some citizens feel that their government is not responsive to the needs of the people. Typically born in the universities, violence appears as the next logical step, after dialogue and protest fail to trigger change. Students, passionate about their country and frustrated by their failure to bring about change through the participatory methods they have been taught, take to the countryside to force change through violence.

Insurgency is not a war fought over land or territory, or even political systems, but over needs. Needs for things like justice, human rights, and a man's ability to feed his family. In the Philippines, poverty and despair continue to feed the beast, driving new fighters to join the rebels every day. Some are no more than children, victims of inadequate education and the certain belief that life will never improve for them. They often join for the same reasons that city kids join gangs. The group offers a sense of strength, protection, and livelihood and asks only loyalty in return, at least in the beginning. And for the same reason that a poor mother can sometimes give her beloved child up for adoption, some parents would rather see their sons and daughters fighting with a group that will guarantee their welfare than to see them repeat the cycle of hopelessness they face in their own lives.

Even minor abuses, suffered repeatedly, are enough to convince many people that they must take their welfare into their own hands. Almost like a religion, the insurgency offers a solution. We are your army, they say. We are here to protect you and to improve your lives. Join us, support us, fight with us, and life will be better. For the desperately hopeless, it is an opiate that is very hard to resist. And almost by design, the government, through its failings and its abuses, drives people right into the welcoming arms of the insurgents. Most government social programs are so choked with bureaucracy, inadequate funding, and endless requirements as to be of only limited usefulness to the needy Filipino. The cost of government services is often greater than the value of the help they provide, and abuses by authorities cause irrepairable damage.

The poor don't particularly want a communist government. Nor do they want a shadow army roaming the countryside, forcibly collecting "revolutionary taxes" and dishing out justice with executions, bombings, and bus-burnings. What they do want is a government that responds to their needs. In India, an insurgency has been ongoing for many years. In a BBC News story some time ago, villagers were asked why they support the rebels, called Naxalites, rather than the government. The response from many people was simply "we see the Naxalites, we don't see the government". Similarly in the Philippines, the insurgents are often more reliable than the government, at least according to the popular view. I seldom hear people threatening to report a particular injustice to the police. Many people believe there is simply no use in doing that. And even if they did, they would likely have to pay for the service. But on several occasions I have heard people threaten to report a corrupt policeman or government official to the NPA. In one sentence, the fact that people feel a greater sense of support from the Communist New People's Army than from their own government is the very answer to the problem itself.

The Military Solution

While there is certainly a military aspect to the insurgency, the solution is most definitely not combat. If this was just a fight between two opposing armies, the outcome would have been decided long ago. But this war grew out of intolerable conditions created and then perpetuated by the government itself, through both its failings and the intentional abuses of its officials. Those conditions are the stated reason the insurgents are fighting in the first place, and they are undeniably the reason new recruits continue to enlist in the rebel army. Until the conditions change, the fighting will continue.

There is only one solution to a 35 year old war that is supported by citizens who feel that their own government is the enemy. And that solution is not to meet force with force. Insurgents in the Philippines often claim to control certain areas, but they are never talking about geographic territory. They are talking about hearts and minds. And the truth is, the government is doing most of the PR work for the rebels. Even the most uneducated farmer is smart enough to know that a mayor's job is not to enrich himself and his friends at the farmer's expense. People must see hope and opportunity. They must believe that if someone does wrong to them, they can find legitimate redress through their government, even if the violator is an official of that government. The people do not believe that now, and they do not have hope. This is why the fighting continues. Once these conditions are corrected, there will simply be no more support for rebellion. Once the people start to believe, and to actually see, that their government is there to support them, the insurgency will have lost its mass base, and it will simply wither away. The few factions or groups that continue armed activity after that will have lost their idealogical foundation and can be considered to be nothing more than criminals. Without the people's support to hide, feed, and fund them, they can be rounded up relatively quickly, assuming that law enforcement elements are up to the task.

Obviously, resources are limited and government cannot yet afford to provide every service to every citizen. That is not what the people are asking for. The people of this country simply want honest, fair treatment within the limits of the government's ability. And the people are not stupid. They can plainly see that a promise made or a law passed in Manila, that is blatantly ignored by a corrupt local government, is not working in their interest. The insurgency gains strength every time a local policeman demands a bribe, or a local official awards a contract to a company he himself secretly owns. Every time the military arrests a "sympathizer" from within the local population, it drives another wedge between the people and the government. Many more people than you would believe are "sympathetic". Not to the methods of the insurgents, but certainly to their ideals. Again, this is not a political war, despite the politics of those at the top. For Juan Dela Cruz, this is a fight for survival.

No, the answer to the insurgency is not military. The military has to be involved, because violence is involved. Laws must be enforced, and order must be maintained, and in many parts of the country the Armed Forces is the only entity up to the task, at least for now. It is critical though that all law enforcement functions be transferred to civilian authorities as quickly as possible, even in remote areas. The military is, and must remain, the fighting component but that must be the limit of their role in this war. Except during actual combat, all arrests must be made by civilian law enforcement authorities, supported by properly issued warrants. And even those captured in combat must be transferred to civilian control in a reasonably short time. The military will no doubt protest loudly, arguing that this will hinder their ability to conduct effective operations. But it is necessary to insert a layer of checks and balances to improve the military's image as protector of the people, and to prevent abuses, real or perceived. Keep in mind, these are not foreign prisoners of war. They are Filipino citizens who have broken the law. Military interrogators should continue to enjoy the same level of access to these prisoners as before, but the fact that they are under civilian control will greatly reinforce the public perception that they are being treated fairly, and in accordance with the law. In the big picture, the value of this measure will far outweigh any loss of operational effectiveness.

In a conflict of this nature, military action alone can never succeed in doing anything more than holding the line. Currently, the military situation between government and rebel forces is holding in a sort of tit-for-tat status. Rebel units initiate some sort of military action and government forces pursue, confident that they are protecting the people against unlawful violence. Government forces capture or kill insurgents, and the rebels retaliate, equally confident that they are protecting the people against an oppressive and abusive regime. Rebel numbers have dropped from their all-time high of more than 23,000 in the early 1980's, but they have also risen occasionally, in cycles that seem to correspond to the public's expectations and subsequent frustrations with government. This has been the status quo for years, and it only serves to reiterate the futility of a purely military response. If every last member of the New People's Army were wiped out today, the root causes of the insurgency would still exist, and a new rebel force would eventually arise. Read that sentence again, because it is at the heart of the matter:

If every last member of the New People's Army were wiped out today, the root causes of the insurgency would still exist, and a new rebel force would eventually arise.

Three and a half decades should certainly be long enough for anyone to see that meeting force with force is not the solution to this problem.

Negotiations

Despite government convictions to the contrary, negotiations with the insurgent leadership is also not the answer, although dialogue is certainly necessary. Think about this. The New People's Army has been fighting for 35 years, against five different administrations, and has seen very little improvement, if any, in the conditions that drove them to war in the first place. It is not logical to believe that they would simply give up the fight, on the basis of government promises to change. There is great value though, for the rebels, in long-term negotiations. Negotiations lend legitimacy to the insurgent leadership, at least in the eyes of the Filipino people. As long as government treats them as respected equals by meeting over the conference table, the leadership will continue to be seen as romantic and heroic figures to a great many Filipinos. In addition, as long as the two sides are talking, government forces will be restrained. Meanwhile, the people's dissatisfaction with government continues to fester. Time is the insurgent's ally, an idea expressed by their own strategy of "protracted war".

For those in the most senior positions, there is also the very real truth that they have nothing to gain, and everything to lose, by reaching a negotiated settlement. Jose Maria Sison is a powerful man, living a fine life on the donations of benefactors and the financial collections of the organization under him. If he were to negotiate and reach a settlement with the government, he would become at best an "also-ran", someone who "used to be somebody". At worst, he would spend years in prison as the sacrificial lamb so often demanded in situations like this. In truth, once government has won back the confidence and support of the public, and the insurgency has withered away, people like Sison will simply become irrelevant.

The NPA is not an army that is being dragged to war by its leaders. Nor can its actions necessarily be stopped by its leaders. We know this to be true by the various factions that have broken away over the years. This army is self-motivated, with individual fighters being driven by anger, frustration and desperation, along with a heavy dose of simple criminal greed. The leadership and the ideology give the movement structure and direction, but they do not drive the individual rebel soldier. Government's unresponsiveness and abuse provide that fuel quite nicely. Any settlement reached between the government and the insurgent leadership will certainly benefit the leaders, but will not resolve the underlying issues that drive a farmer's son to join the movement.

The only dialogue necessary, at least in the beginning, should be a constant public awareness campaign to convince the individual rebel soldiers, and of lesser importance, the leadership, that government is actually addressing the problems of the people. Those efforts, of course, will be wasted without widespread visible improvement throughout the country. All the other problems of this country, from poor leadership to corruption to poverty, are the fuel that feeds the movement. Once work begins in earnest to correct those problems, the insurgency will not need to be solved. It will just evaporate, having served its purpose. This should be the only subject of discussion with the rebels. And communication should be directed at the fighters themselves much more than with their leaders. A note of caution here -- Asking the rebel soldiers to "come down from the hills and then we will start fixing things" is simply the wrong message. The work must start first, with visible results, and then you can say "look what we have done so far. Come down and we will finish it together". This stategy will not only bring the fighters down from the hills, it will also win over the hearts and minds of the Filipino people, and dry up their support for the insurgency.

To succeed in this new approach, it is important to carefully rethink current strategy. Around the world, the standard tack in a counter-insurgency campaign is direct military confrontation. Now I am not a pacifist by any means. I am honorably retired after 20 years of service with the US Air Force, and I know that there are times when war is the only option. But I can plainly see, as can anyone who looks carefully, that all the money spent on ammunition, and all the lives lost, and all the property destroyed, has brought this country no closer to peace than when the rebellion began 35 years ago. Every bullet bought has cost a life, with very little ground gained.

This insurgency is nothing more than a symptom of much deeper problems. The solution therefore, is simple, and cost effective -- Treat the problem. The massive sum of money that government has poured into the military effort, and the total amount of "revolutionary taxes" collected by the insurgents over the last 35 years, could have easily paved all the farm-to-market roads in the country. It could have built schools, bought books, and provided health care for millions of citizens.

With that in mind, I suggest a simple but radical change in strategy. Over the years, many people have pointed out the need to focus attention on the nation's ills as the way to defeat the insurgency. Efforts have been made in that direction, but the money has never been there. It's being eaten up by a combat effort that the government incorrectly believes is the first step to solving the problem. The government's strategy of "clear, hold, consolidate, and develop" follows the traditional philosophy of first defeating the insurgency militarily, and then attacking the root causes. And by "development" I get the feeling that we are talking more about physical infrastructure than about cleaning up corrupt local governments. This is not a simple matter of paving roads and building schools. Money is only one piece of the solution. The insurgency will collapse only when honest effort is made, and real improvement is seen, in eliminating the fundamental problems of this country. That sounds like an impossibly tall order, but it really boils down to "providing honest government services through honest government officials". Part of the funding for this massive effort, especially for the physical development side, can be taken from a military "peace dividend". If the military were to shift to a purely defensive posture, and reduce its expenditures accordingly, a massive amount of money would become available for use in a full-force assault on the corruption and services problems. Such an attack will weaken the insurgency a thousand times more than any military campaign. Under the current strategy, both the expense and the effort are wasted in fighting rebel soldiers, who are actually only a symptom of the real problem.

This is not the macho solution, and it certainly requires more than a little pride to be swallowed, especially by the military. But it is the right solution for the problem, and it is the solution that will work. Changing strategy certainly does not mean that the military has failed. It only means that the problem was never a military problem to begin with. Recognizing this and moving ahead will be a great achievement, and should be seen as a source of pride for the nation. Other countries, faced with similar problems, will certainly see it that way once we have shown that it can be done.

This is not just an essay on the shortcomings of the Philippine Government. It is a plan, with each step clearly spelled out. Government must take a hard line with its own officials to force change, but it is absolutely do-able and very, very easy. This is a war that will never end by treaty or concession. It is a war that will begin to end on the day the people start to believe that their own government is there to protect them and to serve their needs.