New Emporers In The Same Old Clothes?

Since I started writing this blog (only recently, I admit) I've tried hard to avoid making purely negative comments without offering at least some small suggestion for improvement. But today I saw a line in the newspaper, for which I can offer no advice. Just a sad observation. The paper was the Philippine Daily Inquirer, and the article was entitled "Filipino ballet star returns home to culture shock". The article itself is not important. The line that got my attention though, says:

"Marcos, whose regime was marked by massive corruption, was deposed in 1986 following a popular revolt. But successive presidents have failed to solve the country's problems of huge poverty and a gaping rich-poor chasm."

You know, I'm just a poor foreigner who may not really understand the country as well as some, but I have to ask why we continue to use the corruption label to distinguish any one administration from another. Marcos was still president when I first arrived in this country, and the truth is, I don't see any difference today at all. Sure, the thefts may be a little more sophisticated nowadays, but I don't think they are any less common.

And by the way, it's also not accurate to separate the issue of corruption from the issues of poverty and the "rich-poor chasm". The country actually has plenty of money. Poverty and the Grand Canyon which divides the rich and the poor are the direct result of massive corruption. Money, which should be used for building roads and schools and social programs for the whole country, is instead used to buy mansions and cars and vacations abroad for a select few.

Maybe we should find a new label to describe that sad chapter of Philippine history. Maybe we should call it the "stayed in power for 20 years without benefit of an election" regime. But it certainly doesn't make sense to single that administration out as the only "corruption regime".

How Do You "Withdraw" A Signature?

I really don't understand this one. For the last few days I've been reading about the recently dismissed graft case involving Ronaldo Puno, the former Interior Secretary. I'm not too interested in the case itself because, unfortunately, such cases are a dime a dozen around here. But one of the key points in the case caught my eye. According to news reports, the secretary signed a a government contract, and then later "withdrew" his signature! How the hell can you do that? As I understand the law, once a legal document is signed by the proper official/s, it becomes effective. There are several legal ways to rescind, abrogate, cancel, or otherwise render a document void, but I don't know of any provision under any country's laws that allows an official to "withdraw" his signature. It just can't be done. This is one of the reasons that government approvals take so long in the first place...so that government attorneys and other experts can study an issue and raise objections before a document is signed.

This is why foreign business is so hesitant to come to the Philippines. Documents and contracts have to be treated with almost sacred respect. Before I spend a million dollars (or a hundred million) putting up a business in your country, I have to know that the agreements, which were made binding by our signatures, cannot be broken or cancelled on a whim. The Ninoy Aquino Airport fiasco is a case in point. The contract may have been corrupt as hell, and drastically disadvantageous to the Philippines, but it was legally and properly signed. That formal, legal agreement has to be honored. Now, that's not to say that the country has to accept a loss in such situations. First of all, even while honoring the contract, government can still file charges against anyone who committed a crime by negotiating an illegal agreement. And then pressure can be brought to bear on the other parties to renegotiate the terms of the contract. Faced with a professional, and public, challenge, they may be forced to strike a more honest deal.

I've heard of several instances where a contract was cancelled, or a signature "withdrawn". But that's just not the way honest business is done. This applies to any document, not just contracts. Whether it's in international business or in a small local deal, we must obey a set of common ethics if this country is ever going to move forward. We have to grow up.

Jueteng Money And The Police

In today's Philippine Daily Inquirer, the front page story talks about jueteng, the popular local lottery that is often blamed as the single biggest source of corruption in the country. According to the article, jueteng is a 30 billion peso a year industry, with kickbacks of up to 5 million pesos a month going to high-level government officials, and smaller amounts trickling down to mayors and Barangay officials.

Jueteng in one form or another will always be around. For the poor who make up the bulk of the participants, it's not a sport played for pleasure, but rather a gamble on the possibility of making extra money needed for survival. It is one of those things that is so ingrained into the culture that it can never be stamped out entirely. But there are things we can do to control the harm it does.

According to Isabela Gov Grace Padaca, we cannot rely on the police to fight jueteng, because many police departments receive as much as 80% of their operating budgets from mayors, who in turn get that money from jueteng kickbacks. This, by the way, is only one of many problems which result from police dependence on local government officials. Entire police departments are beholden, not to the city government, but to the elected officials who supply the money.

But as always there is a simple solution. And that solution is through regulation. I am not so naive as to believe that a few rules will clean up the country, but rules do provide the foundation for taking action against violators. We wish we could rely on the honor system, but that's just not realistic. In this case, the rule we need is one that requires ALL police funding to come from the national level.

This doesn't mean that local governments can't financially support their own police forces, it just means they can't do it with direct cash payments. A city mayor can still buy a patrol car for one of his precincts, he just has to route the money through the national government first. And there is no reason that the turnaround should take more than a few days. The moment the national office receives confirmation of a deposit, they can issue a check or otherwise transfer the money to the designated local police department, along with specific instructions on how that money is to be used.

I'm not suggesting that we limit the financial support that a local government can provide to its police department. Just that we regulate that support to prevent illegal payments. The law, and the process itself, would have to be designed to ensure that legitimate support reaches the beneficiary just as quickly as it does now, and that funds cannot be diverted for any reason, but that's not really hard to do. I'm not talking about government giving more money to local police departments. This is a simple rerouting of legitimate government funds, disbursed by city governments to city police departments. Other than the administrative costs of managing this program, there is no additional expense to government. This is a simple check and balance measure which will allow greater control over jueteng money, kickbacks, and the general problem of improper relationships between local government and police officials.

Every mayor in the country already claims that all financial support they provide to their local police comes from legitimate government sources. If this is true, what would be the harm in adding a little check and balance to the process?

Cashless Operations: An Anti-Corruption Strategy

Government collects money for a variety of purposes, including tax and customs payments, fees for services, and fines and penalties for various violations. In reality though, a very large part of that money never makes it to the National Treasury. Sometimes the amount received is intentionally misdeclared, while in other cases money collected by a government official is not reported at all. In addition, money that is not part of the official payment is often given to expedite the service, bypass red tape, or to reduce the total amount owed. This "under the table" payment, of course, goes straight into the collector's pocket.

Many of these payments to government are made in cash. But despite official receipts and documentation, only two people really know how much was actually collected -- the citizen who made the payment and the government employee who received it. Even with an audit, it is difficult to verify that the amount declared on the receipt is the amount which actually changed hands. If a citizen pays the tax-collector a 30,000 peso bribe to reduce his overall income tax by 70,000, it will most likely not be discovered. If a traffic violator pays 200 pesos to a policeman to avoid a 2,000 peso fine, it will definitely not be discovered. This situation exists because payments are made in cash, and because that cash is given directly to individual government employees.

Government also makes many payments in cash, often in very large amounts. Supplies are purchased, bills are paid, and disbursements are made with cash in envelopes, bags, and briefcases. There is simply no way to track that cash as it moves from one person to another, and in some cases it may not be possible to verify that it was even spent at all. The further down we go on the government ladder, the more common this becomes. The widespread use of cash for government transactions openly invites corruption, and effectively defeats any accountability measures that government could impose. It is therefore critical that we take government offices out of the business of handling cash. The best way to do that is simply to prohibit the use of cash for any government transaction, paid or received.

As an example, take a look at the visa offices at some foreign embassies in Manila. Before their appointment, visa applicants are advised to visit any local bank and pay a fixed amount to a specified account. The bank doesn't need any special forms or equipment to do this. It just takes a straight forward deposit. The applicant then brings the deposit slip to the Embassy and presents it as proof that payment was made. There is no question about how much was paid, and it is not possible for anyone at the embassy to divert the funds. It is still possible for bribery or extortion to occur, but it is now much easier to detect and control. Most payments to government could easily be handled the same way.

Along with direct bank deposits, checks are another form of cashless transaction that can prevent corruption, if they are properly controlled. Checks have a built-in tracking system that can almost guarantee accountability. Every check must be made payable to an official government office, at the highest level possible. For example, a check to pay for a fire safety seminar should be written to the Bureau of Fire Protection rather than to the local Fire Marshal. Payment for a building permit should be made out to the "City of..." rather than to the City Engineer. Documentation prepared by the office that performed the service will record the fact that the fee was paid for a service it provided. Funds can then flow back down from the Treasury, if necessary, to the responsible office. The idea is to send each payment straight to the National Treasury before anyone has a chance to divert it. Absolutely no checks paid to government may be made out in the name or title of an individual. All checks issued to government must be "For Deposit Only" even if they are not marked as such. Encashing a check written to any government office must become a criminal offense, for which both the check-holder and the bank can be held liable. Banks can easily enforce these procedures.

Even the more complicated fees, which require computation and adjustment, can be calculated by the appropriate office and then paid at the bank or by check (again made out to the government rather than to an individual). The important thing is to separate the one who computes the fee from the one who collects it.

Paying taxes by bank deposit or by check is already an option in the Philippines, so let's just take it one step further and make it mandatory. Just compute the tax owed, the same way you do now, and then march off to any local bank to make the deposit. Then attach a copy of the deposit slip to your Income Tax Return. The only people inconvenienced will be the cheaters. And every citizen can be guaranteed that not one peso of his payment will ever find its way into a tax collector's pocket.

This will not prevent connivance between the tax collector and the taxpayer to reduce the amount owed, but it will guarantee that all official payments are deposited entirely into the Treasury. Other measures, which I will discuss later, will address the connivance issue.

Now let's look at payments made by government offices. Except for small petty-cash purchases, every one of those payments must also be issued in the form of a check. Government checks must always be made payable to a person or company by name, never "Pay to Cash". Payment to a company must always be endorsed to the name of the company, never to an individual. All government-issued checks must also be "For Deposit Only". This adds one more check-and-balance layer to the process, making it possible to trace the disbursement of government funds all the way into a registered bank account. The No Cash rule must be required all the way down to the Barangay level. And it must apply in all parts of the country. Every Barangay can open an official checking account. The banks will be more than happy to assist.

The Armed Forces must also implement the No Cash policy across the board, with the possible exception of units in the field. In this case, "in the field" means in areas where no banking facilities exist, and there are actually very few of those areas in the country. Every military post has access to a bank through which it can conduct its financial business. And except in the remote jungle, everyone that the military does business with can deposit a government check with very little difficulty. For salary payments, mandatory direct-deposit payroll accounts must be set up when a soldier enlists, eliminating the need for risky payroll shipments. Soldiers can get their money easily through any Automated Teller Machine in the country. There is no justifiable reason why the AFP cannot conduct almost all of its business by check and bank deposit.

Adopting these measures will not only slash corruption and theft, they will also greatly improve the public's confidence in government, and soon after, the confidence of foreign investors. That value alone will make it worth the effort.

Imposing the No Cash rule on government operations is a simple thing. Much more complicated, but just as necessary, will be to encourage the private sector to adopt the same policy. Compliance would have to be voluntary, but it should not be difficult to convince private companies once they have seen the benefits as demonstrated by government's example.

Corruption-proofing

Prohibiting the use of cash, and requiring all government transactions to be made by bank deposit or check will guarantee a dramatic reduction in the theft of government money almost overnight. Corruption will certainly still exist, but it will be much, much harder to get away with it, because it will be much harder for corrupt officials to physically get their hands on the money.

With cashless operations, there is simply no opportunity for money to be diverted. At the very least, there will be a traceable record of every check and every bank deposit. Transactions that are documented in bank records are transactions that can be taxed.

In addition to the direct benefits, cashless transactions will keep more hard currency in the banks, strengthening the nations banking system. It is a win-win situation. This is a perfect example of the way that a solution to one problem can contribute to the solution to another.

Law Enforcement: The Role Of The Supervisor

Once again, a group of policemen have been implicated in criminal activity, this time apparently engaging in a blatant street robbery in Pasig City. According to news reports, some of these cops were even on duty when they committed the crime.

Although the official attitude seems to be changing, incidents of crime and violence involving policemen are usually treated as individual acts of misbehavior, and are attributed to the idea that there are a few "bad apples" in every barrel. Terms like "scalawags" and "erring policemen" are used when referring to cops who have committed serious crimes such as kidnapping and extortion. The fact is, these events are commonplace and indicate a much deeper problem, as well as a complete refusal by the senior leadership to accept the situation for what it really is.

Consider the all too common newspaper reports about a group of cops who abduct a person, usually under the pretense of making an arrest. The poor guy is sometimes taken to a police station, and then carted off to a private residence, where he is either robbed or held for ransom. In other cases, he may actually be held right at the police station and forced to pay the officers so they won't file a particular charge against him.

Think about the way this actually works. A policeman, acting entirely on his own, makes an arrest, brings the subject into the station and locks him up, and then conducts business-style negotiations with the subject or his relatives, ending with the payment of "bail" and the release of the subject. All going on right inside the police station.

Procedures already exist to prevent this kind of activity, but they are not being followed. They are not followed, because they are not enforced. This happens because supervisors are not supervising.

Officially, arresting a person involves more than one cop, and requires a bit of paperwork. At the very least, there is always supposed to be a blotter entry and an incident report, and that means that the station commander or shift supervisor must be involved. In addition, no policeman has the legal authority to release an arrestee on his own. If a mistake has been made, or if release is warranted for some other legitimate reason, there is a legal procedure that must be followed, and the situation must always be fully documented. Formality and procedure exists as a form of check-and-balance, designed to prevent activities such as unlawful detention and extortion by lone-wolf policemen. But in the informal world of Philippine police work, individual cops are allowed to operate so independently that supervisors rarely bother to question their activities.

The bottom line here is pretty simple. The only policemen who have the freedom to engage in criminal or abusive activity are those who are not being properly supervised. If station commanders and shift supervisors would monitor their people’s activities, and require proper documentation of those activities, most criminal behavior by policemen would simply not be possible. Supervisors have the power to completely eliminate this problem.

This is not a situation where rogue policemen are out of control. It is a situation where unsupervised policemen are simply not being controlled. Contrary to the common view of policemen as lone wolf guardians of justice, a cop is a simple employee, whose day should be filled with assignments and tasks. Even on routine patrol, a policeman has duties that should keep him busy. A properly supervised patrolman will not have time to sit and read the newspaper, let alone time to engage in kidnapping or extortion. If cops are kept busy doing the job they are paid to do, and if supervisors stay on top of their people, crimes committed by lawmen will drop almost overnight, not to mention crimes committed by the bad guys the policemen are supposed to be guarding against. This requires active supervision by the leadership at all levels.

Supervision involves more than just being present in the office. It means correcting mistakes and violations, and reprimanding improper behavior. As a matter of fact, every time an on-duty policeman is found to have been involved in kidnapping or any other criminal activity, his supervisor must share in some degree of responsibility -- Simply because the crime could not have been committed if the supervisor had been doing his job.

An important note to keep in mind though -- the main reason policemen should be kept busy is not to control cop-crime. That's just a side benefit. The real reason is because there is so much work that needs to be done, and policemen are being paid a salary to do it. A full day of productive work is not too much to ask in exchange.

No Receipt - No Pay

Just a quick suggestion. Government would like very much to encourage the use of sales receipts, to force businesses to properly report their income, and by extension, to force them to pay the proper tax on that income.

Whenever I go into a McDonalds or Jollibee restaurant, I see a sign which reads "If we fail to give you a receipt, your order is free". The purpose of this, of course, is to help the store prevent its own employees from stealing money. Why don't we pass a law requiring all businesses, of all types, to implement the same policy? I'm sure that most customers would be happy to take advantage of the chance to get some free merchandise, which would force businesses to offer receipts for their own protection. Some people might say that such a requirement is unfair to the poor businessman, but in truth the only businessman who would be hurt is the one who tries to cheat the system.

As a matter of fact, why don't we apply the same law to government services? If a government office fails to give you a receipt for a service it provided to you, that service must be absolutely free. What a concept!

Just a little idea, but it's one of the nuts and bolts that need tightening in this wonderful country we call the Philippines.

Simple Solutions: Traffic

In its ongoing effort to ease the chaotic traffic situation in the capitol city, the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) is about to spend another P50 million to install "loading bays" for public buses along EDSA. The basic idea here is to build a series of fences, through which buses will be chanelled (a lot like the loading chutes used to herd livestock into pens). According to MMDA, we have to resort to this costly measure because bus drivers simply refuse to follow the rules. MMDA first tried to enforce order by painting yellow lanes down the entire length of EDSA, designating one lane for buses and the rest for private vehicles. But, like most rules in the Philippines, this one was simply ignored by everybody.

One of the main causes of congestion along EDSA is the fact that buses race each other in an attempt to pick up more passengers. Drivers don't like to pull completely over to the side of the road because that takes too much time, and somebody else might get to the next stop first. Buses even block each other when they stop, angling in front of another bus which is already stopped, so the other guy can't leave first. The bottom line is, it's a simple race to pick up the most passengers.

Despite popular opinion, this is not an issue of driver discipline. The reason is actually pretty obvious, and it gives us another example of solving a problem by understanding the root cause. Bus drivers are paid a commission for each passenger they carry. If they don't aggressively compete for passengers, they lose money. These drivers are not bad guys, and they aren't necessarily law-breakers. They are just trying to make a living, under the conditions that are laid out for them. Anything we do to slow them down will mean less money in their pocket. And that means that no matter what rules we impose, or how many fences we build, drivers will continue to violate those rules every chance they get. Survival will always be a higher priority than civic responsibility for these drivers.

The simple solution then, is to require transportation companies to pay their drivers a fixed salary, which does not depend on the number of passengers carried. Bus owners, and even some drivers, will argue that this is unfair, and that it interferes with their ability to earn. But the reality is, the same number of passengers will still be waiting at the bus stops every day. The only loss of income will be to those companies and drivers who use the most aggressive tactics on the road, and we can certainly do without those guys. In fact, when you take away the reason for aggressive competition among bus drivers, you open the door to the kind of organized, scheduled public transportation system that we have always wanted. And the improvement in traffic flow will be nearly instantaneous.

Obviously, this will require a new law or two, and there will be resistance. But the benefit will be well worth the effort. We should consider the same idea for taxi operators too, to help eliminate some of the problems that exist there. But I will hold that argument for another time.

The Insurgency: A Realistic Strategy

The communist insurgency in the Philippines is one of the longest-running rebellions in the world, and volumes have been written to document it's thirty-five year existence. The rebellion took root in the desperation of an impoverished people, fueled by a government that failed and, more often, abused those people. The dictatorship that was newly emerging when the insurgency began is gone, but the corruption and mistreatment of the people by their own government continues. Make no mistake, government is an active contributor to the conditions that feed this rebellion. People live in poverty in many countries, including the United States, and still don't take up arms against their government. The outstanding difference, and the one that I believe leads to insurrection, is the fact that those other countries have working governments that make an honest effort to respond to the needs of their people, and do not try to take advantage of them at every opportunity.

The Philippine Government itself is not abusive, but more than a few individuals within government misuse their positions at the expense of the people. Government officials, especially in the outlying areas, operate as if they were feudal lords, controlling their lands with the power of life and death, taxes and fees, and unchecked authority. Renewing a license requires bribe money. Getting a permit to start a business or put up a building requires kickbacks to a host of open hands. Lodging a complaint about such things with the local police requires "filing fees" and "consideration" for the investigators. In some cases, the police themselves provide the muscle to back up corrupt officials. How does one survive in an environment like that? Who does one turn to, when the very government which is supposed to protect you is the one squeezing the life out of you? When the mechanisms that are supposed to prevent such abuses are themselves corrupted?

Rightly or wrongly, a segment of the population has chosen to take up arms against its own government in an effort to force change. That segment does not represent the majority, but it does voice the sentiments of a large part of the population. Traditionally, insurgencies arise because some citizens feel that their government is not responsive to the needs of the people. Typically born in the universities, violence appears as the next logical step, after dialogue and protest fail to trigger change. Students, passionate about their country and frustrated by their failure to bring about change through the participatory methods they have been taught, take to the countryside to force change through violence.

Insurgency is not a war fought over land or territory, or even political systems, but over needs. Needs for things like justice, human rights, and a man's ability to feed his family. In the Philippines, poverty and despair continue to feed the beast, driving new fighters to join the rebels every day. Some are no more than children, victims of inadequate education and the certain belief that life will never improve for them. They often join for the same reasons that city kids join gangs. The group offers a sense of strength, protection, and livelihood and asks only loyalty in return, at least in the beginning. And for the same reason that a poor mother can sometimes give her beloved child up for adoption, some parents would rather see their sons and daughters fighting with a group that will guarantee their welfare than to see them repeat the cycle of hopelessness they face in their own lives.

Even minor abuses, suffered repeatedly, are enough to convince many people that they must take their welfare into their own hands. Almost like a religion, the insurgency offers a solution. We are your army, they say. We are here to protect you and to improve your lives. Join us, support us, fight with us, and life will be better. For the desperately hopeless, it is an opiate that is very hard to resist. And almost by design, the government, through its failings and its abuses, drives people right into the welcoming arms of the insurgents. Most government social programs are so choked with bureaucracy, inadequate funding, and endless requirements as to be of only limited usefulness to the needy Filipino. The cost of government services is often greater than the value of the help they provide, and abuses by authorities cause irrepairable damage.

The poor don't particularly want a communist government. Nor do they want a shadow army roaming the countryside, forcibly collecting "revolutionary taxes" and dishing out justice with executions, bombings, and bus-burnings. What they do want is a government that responds to their needs. In India, an insurgency has been ongoing for many years. In a BBC News story some time ago, villagers were asked why they support the rebels, called Naxalites, rather than the government. The response from many people was simply "we see the Naxalites, we don't see the government". Similarly in the Philippines, the insurgents are often more reliable than the government, at least according to the popular view. I seldom hear people threatening to report a particular injustice to the police. Many people believe there is simply no use in doing that. And even if they did, they would likely have to pay for the service. But on several occasions I have heard people threaten to report a corrupt policeman or government official to the NPA. In one sentence, the fact that people feel a greater sense of support from the Communist New People's Army than from their own government is the very answer to the problem itself.

The Military Solution

While there is certainly a military aspect to the insurgency, the solution is most definitely not combat. If this was just a fight between two opposing armies, the outcome would have been decided long ago. But this war grew out of intolerable conditions created and then perpetuated by the government itself, through both its failings and the intentional abuses of its officials. Those conditions are the stated reason the insurgents are fighting in the first place, and they are undeniably the reason new recruits continue to enlist in the rebel army. Until the conditions change, the fighting will continue.

There is only one solution to a 35 year old war that is supported by citizens who feel that their own government is the enemy. And that solution is not to meet force with force. Insurgents in the Philippines often claim to control certain areas, but they are never talking about geographic territory. They are talking about hearts and minds. And the truth is, the government is doing most of the PR work for the rebels. Even the most uneducated farmer is smart enough to know that a mayor's job is not to enrich himself and his friends at the farmer's expense. People must see hope and opportunity. They must believe that if someone does wrong to them, they can find legitimate redress through their government, even if the violator is an official of that government. The people do not believe that now, and they do not have hope. This is why the fighting continues. Once these conditions are corrected, there will simply be no more support for rebellion. Once the people start to believe, and to actually see, that their government is there to support them, the insurgency will have lost its mass base, and it will simply wither away. The few factions or groups that continue armed activity after that will have lost their idealogical foundation and can be considered to be nothing more than criminals. Without the people's support to hide, feed, and fund them, they can be rounded up relatively quickly, assuming that law enforcement elements are up to the task.

Obviously, resources are limited and government cannot yet afford to provide every service to every citizen. That is not what the people are asking for. The people of this country simply want honest, fair treatment within the limits of the government's ability. And the people are not stupid. They can plainly see that a promise made or a law passed in Manila, that is blatantly ignored by a corrupt local government, is not working in their interest. The insurgency gains strength every time a local policeman demands a bribe, or a local official awards a contract to a company he himself secretly owns. Every time the military arrests a "sympathizer" from within the local population, it drives another wedge between the people and the government. Many more people than you would believe are "sympathetic". Not to the methods of the insurgents, but certainly to their ideals. Again, this is not a political war, despite the politics of those at the top. For Juan Dela Cruz, this is a fight for survival.

No, the answer to the insurgency is not military. The military has to be involved, because violence is involved. Laws must be enforced, and order must be maintained, and in many parts of the country the Armed Forces is the only entity up to the task, at least for now. It is critical though that all law enforcement functions be transferred to civilian authorities as quickly as possible, even in remote areas. The military is, and must remain, the fighting component but that must be the limit of their role in this war. Except during actual combat, all arrests must be made by civilian law enforcement authorities, supported by properly issued warrants. And even those captured in combat must be transferred to civilian control in a reasonably short time. The military will no doubt protest loudly, arguing that this will hinder their ability to conduct effective operations. But it is necessary to insert a layer of checks and balances to improve the military's image as protector of the people, and to prevent abuses, real or perceived. Keep in mind, these are not foreign prisoners of war. They are Filipino citizens who have broken the law. Military interrogators should continue to enjoy the same level of access to these prisoners as before, but the fact that they are under civilian control will greatly reinforce the public perception that they are being treated fairly, and in accordance with the law. In the big picture, the value of this measure will far outweigh any loss of operational effectiveness.

In a conflict of this nature, military action alone can never succeed in doing anything more than holding the line. Currently, the military situation between government and rebel forces is holding in a sort of tit-for-tat status. Rebel units initiate some sort of military action and government forces pursue, confident that they are protecting the people against unlawful violence. Government forces capture or kill insurgents, and the rebels retaliate, equally confident that they are protecting the people against an oppressive and abusive regime. Rebel numbers have dropped from their all-time high of more than 23,000 in the early 1980's, but they have also risen occasionally, in cycles that seem to correspond to the public's expectations and subsequent frustrations with government. This has been the status quo for years, and it only serves to reiterate the futility of a purely military response. If every last member of the New People's Army were wiped out today, the root causes of the insurgency would still exist, and a new rebel force would eventually arise. Read that sentence again, because it is at the heart of the matter:

If every last member of the New People's Army were wiped out today, the root causes of the insurgency would still exist, and a new rebel force would eventually arise.

Three and a half decades should certainly be long enough for anyone to see that meeting force with force is not the solution to this problem.

Negotiations

Despite government convictions to the contrary, negotiations with the insurgent leadership is also not the answer, although dialogue is certainly necessary. Think about this. The New People's Army has been fighting for 35 years, against five different administrations, and has seen very little improvement, if any, in the conditions that drove them to war in the first place. It is not logical to believe that they would simply give up the fight, on the basis of government promises to change. There is great value though, for the rebels, in long-term negotiations. Negotiations lend legitimacy to the insurgent leadership, at least in the eyes of the Filipino people. As long as government treats them as respected equals by meeting over the conference table, the leadership will continue to be seen as romantic and heroic figures to a great many Filipinos. In addition, as long as the two sides are talking, government forces will be restrained. Meanwhile, the people's dissatisfaction with government continues to fester. Time is the insurgent's ally, an idea expressed by their own strategy of "protracted war".

For those in the most senior positions, there is also the very real truth that they have nothing to gain, and everything to lose, by reaching a negotiated settlement. Jose Maria Sison is a powerful man, living a fine life on the donations of benefactors and the financial collections of the organization under him. If he were to negotiate and reach a settlement with the government, he would become at best an "also-ran", someone who "used to be somebody". At worst, he would spend years in prison as the sacrificial lamb so often demanded in situations like this. In truth, once government has won back the confidence and support of the public, and the insurgency has withered away, people like Sison will simply become irrelevant.

The NPA is not an army that is being dragged to war by its leaders. Nor can its actions necessarily be stopped by its leaders. We know this to be true by the various factions that have broken away over the years. This army is self-motivated, with individual fighters being driven by anger, frustration and desperation, along with a heavy dose of simple criminal greed. The leadership and the ideology give the movement structure and direction, but they do not drive the individual rebel soldier. Government's unresponsiveness and abuse provide that fuel quite nicely. Any settlement reached between the government and the insurgent leadership will certainly benefit the leaders, but will not resolve the underlying issues that drive a farmer's son to join the movement.

The only dialogue necessary, at least in the beginning, should be a constant public awareness campaign to convince the individual rebel soldiers, and of lesser importance, the leadership, that government is actually addressing the problems of the people. Those efforts, of course, will be wasted without widespread visible improvement throughout the country. All the other problems of this country, from poor leadership to corruption to poverty, are the fuel that feeds the movement. Once work begins in earnest to correct those problems, the insurgency will not need to be solved. It will just evaporate, having served its purpose. This should be the only subject of discussion with the rebels. And communication should be directed at the fighters themselves much more than with their leaders. A note of caution here -- Asking the rebel soldiers to "come down from the hills and then we will start fixing things" is simply the wrong message. The work must start first, with visible results, and then you can say "look what we have done so far. Come down and we will finish it together". This stategy will not only bring the fighters down from the hills, it will also win over the hearts and minds of the Filipino people, and dry up their support for the insurgency.

To succeed in this new approach, it is important to carefully rethink current strategy. Around the world, the standard tack in a counter-insurgency campaign is direct military confrontation. Now I am not a pacifist by any means. I am honorably retired after 20 years of service with the US Air Force, and I know that there are times when war is the only option. But I can plainly see, as can anyone who looks carefully, that all the money spent on ammunition, and all the lives lost, and all the property destroyed, has brought this country no closer to peace than when the rebellion began 35 years ago. Every bullet bought has cost a life, with very little ground gained.

This insurgency is nothing more than a symptom of much deeper problems. The solution therefore, is simple, and cost effective -- Treat the problem. The massive sum of money that government has poured into the military effort, and the total amount of "revolutionary taxes" collected by the insurgents over the last 35 years, could have easily paved all the farm-to-market roads in the country. It could have built schools, bought books, and provided health care for millions of citizens.

With that in mind, I suggest a simple but radical change in strategy. Over the years, many people have pointed out the need to focus attention on the nation's ills as the way to defeat the insurgency. Efforts have been made in that direction, but the money has never been there. It's being eaten up by a combat effort that the government incorrectly believes is the first step to solving the problem. The government's strategy of "clear, hold, consolidate, and develop" follows the traditional philosophy of first defeating the insurgency militarily, and then attacking the root causes. And by "development" I get the feeling that we are talking more about physical infrastructure than about cleaning up corrupt local governments. This is not a simple matter of paving roads and building schools. Money is only one piece of the solution. The insurgency will collapse only when honest effort is made, and real improvement is seen, in eliminating the fundamental problems of this country. That sounds like an impossibly tall order, but it really boils down to "providing honest government services through honest government officials". Part of the funding for this massive effort, especially for the physical development side, can be taken from a military "peace dividend". If the military were to shift to a purely defensive posture, and reduce its expenditures accordingly, a massive amount of money would become available for use in a full-force assault on the corruption and services problems. Such an attack will weaken the insurgency a thousand times more than any military campaign. Under the current strategy, both the expense and the effort are wasted in fighting rebel soldiers, who are actually only a symptom of the real problem.

This is not the macho solution, and it certainly requires more than a little pride to be swallowed, especially by the military. But it is the right solution for the problem, and it is the solution that will work. Changing strategy certainly does not mean that the military has failed. It only means that the problem was never a military problem to begin with. Recognizing this and moving ahead will be a great achievement, and should be seen as a source of pride for the nation. Other countries, faced with similar problems, will certainly see it that way once we have shown that it can be done.

This is not just an essay on the shortcomings of the Philippine Government. It is a plan, with each step clearly spelled out. Government must take a hard line with its own officials to force change, but it is absolutely do-able and very, very easy. This is a war that will never end by treaty or concession. It is a war that will begin to end on the day the people start to believe that their own government is there to protect them and to serve their needs.